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Recent Interpretations of the "Meaningful 
Reduction" Test of I.R.C. Section 3O2(b) (1). 
Boyd C. Randall* 
A carefully planned stock redemption can often escape divi- 
dend treatment under the "safe harbor" provisions of Internal 
Revenue Code subsections 302(b) (2) - (4) .l If, however, the re- 
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acknowledges the valuable research and editorial assistance rendered by James Skeen of 
the Brigham Young University Law Review in the preparation of this article. 
1. I.R.C. 4 302(b)(2)-(4): 
(b) Redemptions treated as exchanges. 
. . . .  
(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock. 
(A) In general. Subsection (a) [providing sale treatment] 
shall apply if the distribution is substantially disproportionate 
with respect to the shareholder. 
(B) Limitation. This paragraph shall not apply unless imme- 
diately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50 
percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of 
stock entitled to vote. 
(C) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph, the distribu- 
tion is substantially disproportionate if- 
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation 
owned by the shareholder immediately after the redemp- 
tion bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation a t  
such time, is less than 80 percent of- 
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation 
owned by the shareholder immediately before the re- 
demption bears to all of the voting stock of the corpora- 
tion a t  such time. 
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated 
as substantially disproportionate unless the shareholder's own- 
ership of the common stock of the corporation (whether voting 
or nonvoting) after and before redemption also meets the 80 
percent requirement of the preceding sentence. For purposes of 
the preceding sentence, if there is more than one class of com- 
mon stock, the determinations shall be made by reference to 
fair market value. 
(D) Series of redemptions. This paragraph shall not apply 
to any redemption made pursuant to a plan the purpose or 
effect of which is a series of redemptions resulting in a distribu- 
tion which (in the aggregate) is not substantially dispropor- 
tionate with respect to the shareholder. 
(3) Termination of shareholder's interest. Subsection (a) shall 
apply if the redemption is in complete redemption of all of the stock 
of the corporation owned by the shareholder. 
(4) Stock issued by railroad corporations in certain reorganiza- 
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demption does not meet the requirements of any of these subsec- 
tions, it still may be "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" 
and therefore qualify for sale treatment under section 3q2(b)(l) 
rather than dividend treatmente2 In spite of a large volume of case 
law examining the dividend equivalency issue, including the 1970 
Supreme Court decision of United States v. D a v i ~ , ~  the meaning 
of the section 302(b)(l) test has remained unclear. The test has 
therefore proved difficult to use as a planning tool. The purpose 
of this article is to examine recent cases and revenue rulings that 
suggest the probable parameters of the "dividend equivalency" 
test as it applies to common and preferred stock redemptions. 
The issue of dividend equivalency originated because of the 
difference in tax consequences between a liquidating distribution, 
which is taxed as a sale (usually receiving preferential capital 
gain treatment),4 and an earnings distribution, which is taxed as 
a dividend (usually receiving ordinary income treatment) Before 
1921, a taxpayer who wished to reduce his tax could convert a 
distribution of earnings into a liquidating distribution by causing 
the corporation to issue a nontaxable stock dividend6 and then to 
redeem the stock dividend for cash. In 1921, Congress took steps 
to defeat this method of tax avoidance by enacting a statute 
imposing a tax on the shareholder when the redemption of stock, 
previously issued as a dividend, was "essentially equivalent to the 
distribution of a taxable di~idend."~ The statute was amended in 
19248 and in 1926' in order to prevent further tax avcidance 
schemes.1° The 1926 version of the statute was codified in the 
tions. Subsection (a) shall apply if the redemption is of stock issued 
by a railroad corporation (as defined in section 77(m) of the Bank- 
ruptcy Act, as amended) pursuant to a plan of reorganization under 
section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. 
Section 302(b)(4) is too narrow to be of general planning use to the practitioner. 
2. I.R.C. 8 302(b)(l): "Subsection (a) [providing sale treatment] shall apply if the 
redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend." 
3. 397 U.S. 301 (1970). 
4. See Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221 (1918). This rule is embodied in I.R.C. § 331. 
5. See Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918). This rule is part of the current statutory 
scheme. I.R.C. $ 8  301, 316. 
6. A stock dividend was not taxable to the shareholder. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 
U.S. 189 (1920). Cf. I.R.C. § 305 (dealing with stock dividends). 
7. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 228-29. 
8. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(f), 43 Stat. 255. 
9. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 4 201(g), 44 Stat. 11. 
10. Taxpayers were able to circumvent the 1921 statute by first having the corpora- 
tion redeem some of their stock and then having the corporation replace it by issuing new 
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Internal Revenue Code of 1939 as section 1 l5(g). l1 
Courts interpreted the test of "dividend equivalency" to be 
a factual inquiry into whether or not the "net effect" of the trans- 
action more closely resembled a dividend or a stock sale.12 Al- 
though many factors were considered in the test,13 the major con- 
sideration was whether a valid business reason existed for the 
redemption.14 The factual nature of the test, however, made it 
almost useless to taxpayers as a planning tool and produced some 
confusion in its interpretation by the courts.15 
In an effort to eliminate the uncertainty of the dividend 
equivalency test, the House of Representatives drafted a new test 
as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954." The House pro- 
posal eliminated the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" lan- 
guage and provided objective guidelines1' that now comprise 
subsections 302(b)(2)-(4). The Senate, however, restored the lan- 
guage of the 1939 Code with this explanation: 
While the House bill set forth definite conditions under which 
stock may be redeemed at  capital-gain rates, these rules ap- 
peared unnecessarily restrictive, particularly, in the case of re- 
demptions of preferred stock which might be called by the cor- 
poration without the shareholder having any control over when 
stock as a dividend. The 1924 amendment closed this loophole. Finally, the 1926 amend- 
ment made distributions that were "essentially equivalent to a dividend" taxable as 
ordinary income regardless of whether any pre- or post-redemption stock dividend was 
made. 
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 48 (current version at I.R.C. § 
302(b)(l)). 
12. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940); McGuire v. 
Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 591 (1936). 
13. For a listing of these factors, see Comment, Defining Dividend Equivalency 
Under Section 302(b)(l), 16 VILL. L. REV. 88, 89-90 (1970). 
14. See Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAX L. REV. 
437, 468 (1950). 
15. See Comment, Dividend Equivalence Under Section 302(b)(l) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954-The Relevance of the Necessary Business Transaction, 9 B.C. 
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 444, 445 (1968). 
16. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (1954). 
17. The House report explained the change as follows: 
The approach adopted in section 115(g) of existing law, whereby the conse- 
quences resulting from the redemption of stock may be taxed depending upon 
the factual circumstances surrounding the redemption have been changed by 
your committee. In lieu of a factual inquiry in every case, it is intended to 
prescribe specific conditions from which the taxpayer may ascertain whether a 
given redemption will be taxable at rates applicable to the sale of assets or as a 
distribution of property not in redemption of stock subject to section 301. 
H.R. REP. NO. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, A72-A73, reprinted in [I9541 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4210. 
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the redemption may take place. Accordingly, your committee 
follows existing law by reinserting the general language indicat- 
ing that a redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part 
or full payment in exchange for stock if the redemption is hot  
essentially equivalent to a dividend. This general rule is supple- 
mented by your committee by the rule of the House bill that a 
redemption which is substantially disproportionate shall also 
qualify so as not to be taxable as a dividend.18 
As finally enacted, section 302(b)(l) of the 1954 Code con- 
tained the same "essentially equivalent to a dividend" test pre- 
viously found in section 115(g) of the 1939 Code. Subsections 
302(b)(2)-(4) of the new provision also contained the objective 
rules proposed by the House, commonly referred to as "safe har- 
bors." In addition, section 302(c) provided that the attribution 
rules of section 31B1@ would apply in determining whether the 
ownership tests of section 302 were satisfied.20 
In the years following enactment of section 302(b)(l), the 
courts struggled to define the parameters of its appl i~at ion.~~ Dur- 
ing this period, a conflict developed in the circuits as to whether 
business purpose was still a relevant consideration in determining 
dividend equivalency under section 3O2(b) (1) .22 The Supreme 
Court, in the landmark case of United States v. Davis,23 finally 
resolved the issue by holding that the existence of a business 
purpose for the distribution was irrelevant and did not qualify the 
distribution as being not essentially equivalent to a dividend.24 
The Court then established that in order for a'distribution to be 
not essentially equivalent to a dividend, it  must result in a 
"meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate inter- 
18. S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45, reprinted in [I9541 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& AD. NEWS 4621, 4675. 
19. The purpose of 4 318 is to "[plrovide rules to indicate specific instances when, 
for purposes of preventing tax avoidance, a person shall be considered to own stock owned 
by a related person." S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in [I9541 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4675. 
20. Although the language of I.R.C. 4 302(c) does not clearly require that the attribu- 
tion rules be applied in a determination of dividend equivalence under 4 302(b)(l), United 
States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), held the rules to be applicable. See note 28 and 
accompanying text infra. 
21. For a history of the judicial interpretation of $ 302(b)(l), see United States v. 
Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970) and Comment, Defining Dividend Equivalency Under Section 
302(b)(l), 16 VILL. L. REV. 88, 94-98 (1970). 
22.For a listing of the alignment of the circuits, see United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 
301, 303 n.2 (1970). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 312. 
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e ~ t . " ~ ~  The Court also held that the attribution rules of section 318 
must be used to measure ownership interest in determining divi- 
dend e q ~ i v a l e n c y . ~ ~ l t h o u g h  Davis resolved the conflict sur- 
rounding the application of the business purpose testn and defi- 
nitely established that the section 318 attribution rules would 
apply to a section 302(b)(l) redemption," the courts were faced 
with the task of determining when a redemption would create a 
meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest. 
In determining whether the meaningful reduction test has 
been met, recent cases and revenue rulings have looked to the 
reduction of shareholder interests such as voting control, the right 
to current earnings, and the right to assets on liq~idation.~' The 
remainder of this article will discuss which of these interests must 
be reduced and to what extent in order to satisfy the Davis test. 
Because 'these considerations depend primarily upon the stock 
ownership pattern in which the redemption occurs, the article 
will focus on redemptions in two general contexts, redemptions 
of common stock and redemptions of preferred stock. 
A. Redemptions of Common Stock 
1.  Shareholder having complete ownership 
What constitutes a meaningful reduction seems to be very 
clear when one shareholder is deemed to own 100 percent of a 
corporation's common stock. The Court in Davis concluded that 
25. Id. at 313. 
26. Id. at 306-07. 
27. The post-Davis decisions have uniformly rejected business purpose as a factor in 
their determination of dividend equivalency. See, e.g., Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. United 
States, 326 F. Supp. 617,620 (1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973); Estate of Runnels 
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 762 (1970). 
28. The attribution rules have generally been applied since Davis. The single excep- 
tion was a case where the taxpayer argued that attribution should not be applied because 
of family hostility. Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975), vacating 62 
T.C. 145 (1974). 
29. The Second Circuit first defined "ownership interest" as comprising these three 
interests. See Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815,817 (2d Cir. 1964). Since Davis was 
decided, the majority of 9 302(b)(l) cases have discussed these shareholder interests. The 
Commissioner has also adopted this definition of ownership for purposes of determining 
whether a shareholder's interest has been meaningfully reduced. See Rev. Rul. 76-385, 
1976-2 C.B. 92; Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91; Rev. Rul. 75-512, 1975-2 C.B. 112; Rev. 
Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111. 
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"a redemption [of a sole shareholder's stock] is always 
'essentially equivalent to a dividend' within the meaning of that 
phrase in $302(b)(1). . . ."% Thus, there can never be a mean- 
ingful reduction of a sole shareholder's interest regardless of how 
much of his stock the corporation redeems.31 Although the re- 
demption in Davis was of preferred stock, a review of the post- 
Davis cases involving redemptions of the common stock of sole 
shareholders reveals that the rule has been followed in every in- 
stance-including those when ownership was constructive rather 
than 
2. Shareholder having majority ownership 
Almost every court that has considered the application of 
"meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate inter- 
est" in the context of a redemption of common stock of a majority 
shareholder has concluded that reduction of voting power or con- 
trol is the determinative factor.33 The language of a California 
federal district court in Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. United 
States is representative: "[Tlhe redemption must result in a 
meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest 
(voting power) in the corporation . . . In addition, a recent 
revenue ruling suggests that the degree of shareholder control is 
the primary consideration involved in determining whether there 
has been such a meaningful reduction.35 
As previously noted," the stock attribution rules of section 
318 are strictly applied in measuring whether a meaningful reduc- 
30. 397 U.S. at 307 (footnote omitted). 
31. If, however, the taxpayer completely redeems his interest, he may satisfy another 
"safe harbor" provision, I.R.C. O 302(b)(3). Note 1 supra. 
32. See Johnson v. United States, 434 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1970) (constructive); Green- 
berg v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 331 (1974) (actual); Maher v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 441 
(1970) (constructive), modified, 469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972); Estate of Runnels v. Com- 
missioner, 54 T.C. 762 (1970) (constructive). See a2so Rev. Rul. 55-515, 1955-2 C.B. 222. 
The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit court to consider the issue. 
33. See Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 609 (8th Cir. 1973); Shimberg v. 
United States, 415 F. Supp. 832, 836 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. United 
States, 326 F. Supp. 617, 620-21 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973); 
Robinson v. United States, 28 A.F.T.R.2d 71-5891,71-5893 (N.D. Ala. 1971); Niedermeyer 
v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280,287-88 (1974), aff'd per curium, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1976); 
Fehrs Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 174,185 (1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974). 
34. 326 F. Supp. 617, 620-21 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affyd, 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973). 
35. Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text infra. 
See also Rev. Rul. 56-182, 1956-1 C.B. 157; Rev. Rul. 56-103, 1956-1 C.B. 159. 
36. See note 28 and accompanying text supra. 
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tion has occurred. Thus, even if a majority shareholder's actual 
stock ownership has been decreased or even terminated,37 the 
court will also look to whether an increase or decrease in construc- 
tive stock ownership has occurred. The principle is exemplified 
by Title Insurance and Trust. That case involved three trusts, 
each of which, prior to the redemption, owned stock as follows: 
Actual Ownership Constructive Ownership Total 
15% 55% 70% 
Each trust had all of its actual shares redeemed, but because of 
stock attribution, each constructively owned 100 percent of the 
corporation's stock following the redemptionea8 The district court 
determined that the redemption did not result in a "meaningful 
reduction of the shareholder's (trusts) proportionate interest in 
the corp~ration."~~ This determination was upheld on appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit.40 The Tax Court has also adopted the view of 
the Ninth Circuit that when a redemption results in an increase 
in the redeeming shareholder's proportionate interest in the cor- 
poration, even if due to the application of constructive ownership 
rules, it  can never qualify for sale treatment under section 
302 (b) (1) .41 
Other decisions have indicated that a minor reduction in a 
majority shareholder's common stock interest will not be a mean- 
ingful reduction if the shareholder continues to exercise majority 
control over the corporation. In Fehrs Finance Co. v. 
Commissioner, 42 the taxpayer experienced a 9.5 percent reduction 
in common stock ownership from 98.2 percent to 88.69 percent. 
Neither the Tax Court nor the Eighth Circuit viewed this reduc- 
tion as meaningful because the taxpayer's control of the corpora- 
tion remained essentially unaltered.43 The Tax Court, however, 
- 
37. If a majority stockholder's actual ownership is completely terminated as a result 
of a redemption, he may qualify for sale treatment under I.R.C. 8 302(b)(3). Section 
302(b)(3) is not available, however, to trusts or estates. See Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B. 
106; Rev. Rul. 68-388, 1968-2 C.B. 122. But see Rickey v. United States, [I977 Adv. Sh.] 
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) (77-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 7 9275 (W.D. La. Oct. 16, 1976); 
Crawford v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 830 (1973). 
38. After the corporation redeemed the stock of each trust, the corporation was owned 
100% by the parents of the trust's child beneficiaries. The parents' stock ownership was 
therefore attributed to each trust by virtue of I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(l)(A) and 3l8(a) (3)(B)(i). 
39. 326 F. Supp. at 621. 
40. 484 F.2d at 465. 
41. Sawelson v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 109 (1973). 
42. 58 T.C. 174 (1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 
(1974). 
43. The Tax* Court held that "a reduction in stock ownership from 98.2 to 88.69 
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suggested that under different circumstances a 9.5 percent reduc- 
tion might be meaningful: "[Tlhe same percentage spread 
might make a great deal of difference if the initial figure was not 
such a very high one, and there might be unusual circumstances 
in which the exact percentage reduction here would be mate- 
rial."" In Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, ' s  the "initial figure" was 
not quite as high as in Fehrs Finance, yet the Tax Court held that 
a 7.5 percent reduction from 90.49 percent to 82.96 percent was 
not meaningful. Again, the court suggested that the shareholder's 
retention of control was the disqualifying factor.46 
In Jones v. United States,47 a federal district court was even 
more explicit in holding that retention of control will disqualify 
a majority shareholder from sale treatment: "The Court finds as 
a matter of law that ownership of such a vast majority [96.1 
percent] of corporate stock precludes a finding that plaintiffs 
attributed interest had been meaningfully reduced . . . . "48 
Revenue Ruling 75-502" sets forth the Commissioner's view 
regarding redemptions of the common stock of a majority share- 
holder. Before the redemption, the taxpayer estate in the ruling 
owned actually and constructively approximately 57 percent of 
the total voting rights of the corporation. After the redemption, 
the taxpayer had no actual ownership but owned 50 percent of the 
corporation by virtue of section 318 attribution. The Commis- 
sioner ruled that the redemption resulted in a meaningful reduc- 
ti~n.~O Although the ruling mentioned the right to share in the 
percent does not deprive such a dominant shareholder of his ability to control the corpo- 
rate activities; such a reduction does not affect the shareholder's relationship to the 
corporation in any significant way." 58 T.C. at 185. See also 487 F.2d a t  187. 
44. 58 T.C. at 185. 
45. 62 T.C. 280 (1974). 
46. Id. at 287-88 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added): 
We do not think a reduction in ownership of the AT&T common stock from 90.49 
percent to 82.96 percent constitutes a meaningful reduction of petitioners' pro- 
portionate interest in AT&T in the instant case. With such a small change in a 
high percentage interest, petitioners' control and ownership of AT&T is essen- 
tially unaltered and cannot be considered to have undergone a meaningful re- 
duction. An 82.96 percent interest clearly is sufficient to dominate and control 
the policies of the corporation. 
Cf. Rev. Rul. 73-2,1973-1 C.B. 171,172 (suggesting in a § 304 context that a 19% reduction 
in ownership from 100% to 81% does not meet the test of 3 302(b)(l)). 
47. 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,208 (D.N.J. 1972). 
48. Id. at 84,212 (emphasis added). The majority shareholder's common stock owner- 
ship had been reduced from 98.5% to 96.1%. 
49. 1975-2 C.B. 111. 
50. Id. at 112. 
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corporation's assets on liquidation and the right to share in cur- 
rent and accumulated earnings, it is clear that reduction of con- 
trol was the most important factor. The Commissioner stated: 
"Moreover, the reduction of the estate's voting rights from 57 
percent to 50 percent produced a situation in which the other 50 
percent of the voting rights of X were held by a single unrelated 
shareholder?l In other words, the shareholder had lost his voting 
control as a result of the redemption. The final paragraph of the 
ruling confirmed that the loss of control was the most relevant 
factor influencing the Commissioner's position: 
If in the instant case, the stock of X held by the estate was 
reduced by less than 7 [percentage points] the redemption 
would not qualify under section 302(b)(l) because the estate 
would continue to have dominant voting rights in X by virtue 
of its ownership of more than 50 percent of the X 
Two recent cases collaterally related to section 302 by virtue 
of section 35653 confirm that loss of majority control as a result of 
a redemption of common stock constitutes a meaningful reduc- 
tion of a shareholder's proportionate interest. In Wright v. United 
S t ~ t e s , ~ '  a taxpayer participated in a corporate reorganization 
under section 368, receiving stock in the newly formed corpora- 
tion. Incidental to the reorganization, the taxpayer also received 
a $102,002 note. The Eighth Circuit characterized the transaction 
as a reorganization in which the taxpayer received an 85 percent 
stock ownership interest in the new corporation, followed by a 
51. Id. 
52. Id. The Commissioner's ruling states that the estate would have had "dominant 
voting rights in X" had its stock ownership been reduced by less than 7 percentage points. 
In fact, the estate had no actual ownership following the redemption. Its voting rights were 
due entirely to its attributed stock. Although this position is probably consistent with 
Davis, see notes 26,28 and accompanying text supra, the estate in fact may not have been 
able to exercise any control over the stock attributed to it. Cf. Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 
510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that family hostility may prevent the attribution rules 
from applying). 
53. I.R.C. 4 356 outlines the tax consequences of receipt of additional consideration 
in certain corporate reorganizations. Section 356(a)(2) provides in part: "If an exchange 
. . . has the effect of the distribution of a dividend, theh there shall be treated as a 
dividend to each distributee such an amount . . . ." (emphasis added). Both the courts 
and the Commissioner have recognized that the redemption provisions of § 302 and O 
356(a)(2) should be read in pari materia in determining whether a distribution has the 
"effect . . . of a dividend" under § 356(a)(2). See Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 
605 (8th Cir. 1973); Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross 
v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); Rev. 
Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112, 113; Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118, 119. 
54. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973). Accord, Rickey v. United States, [I977 Adv. Sh.] 
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) (77-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9 9275 (W.D. La. Oct. 16, 1976). 
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redemption of a portion of the stock in exchange for the note. 
After the redemption the taxpayer owned 61.7 percent of the 
corporation's stock.55 Even though the taxpayer was still the ma- 
jority shareholder, the court held that the redemption had caused 
a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's interest. The court 
reasoned that since Arkansas state law required a two-thirds ma- 
jority for certain extraordinary corporate  decision^,^^ the redemp- 
tion had caused the taxpayer to lose voting control. The rule in 
Wright is broader than the rule laid out by the Commissioner in 
Revenue Ruling 75-50257 because Wright suggests that a share- 
holder who experiences a practical loss of voting control for any 
reason, whether control is defined by state law or perhaps by the 
articles of incorporation, may qualify for sale treatment even if 
he retains his status as the majority shareholder. 
A more recent decision reaffirms the relative importance of 
a loss of voting control. In Shimberg v. United States,58 the tax- 
payer initially owned approximately 66 percent of the common 
stock of corporation A, which gave him a controlling interest in 
the corporation. Pursuant to a plan of merger, the shareholders 
of corporation A exchanged their stock for stock and cash in cor- 
poration B, a publicly held corporation listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange. Following the merger, the taxpayer's ownership 
interest in corporation B was less than 1 percent." The court held 
that the merger had resulted in a meaningful reduction of the 
taxpayer's interest because his voting control had been virtually 
exting~ished.~~ 
55. This characterization was disputed by the Commissioner who argued that the 
exchange of stock for the note occurred prior to the merger. The reduction in ownership, 
therefore, should have been measured in terms of the taxpayer's ownership in the initial 
corporation. 482 F.2d at 607. The Commissioner has formally objected to the Eighth 
Circuit's characterization of the facts in Wright. Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112, 113. 
Although the Commissioner's view of the facts in Wright may affect the application of O 
302(b)(l) in future 8 356 cases, the principles established in Wright continue to be relevant 
in other 8 302(b)(l) cases. 
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. 88 64-507, -703, -901 (1966). 
57. 1975-2 C.B. 111. 
58. 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976). 
59. Id. at 836. 
60. Id: 
His former rights to direct the affairs of LSC were extinguished. His interest in 
MGIC afforded him no control whatsoever over the destiny of the large national 
corporation. No longer was he the major "owner" of a successful local company 
operating in several Florida counties. He was then the holder of a minuscule 
percentage of the outstanding stock in a huge publicly-held corporation. It is 
clear that the merger resulted in a radical change and meaningful reduction in 
the nature of the Plaintiffs interest in the continuing business. 
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Thus, it seems clear from these recent cases and rulings that, 
a in the case of a majority stockholder, both the Commissioner and 
the courts consider loss of voting control to be the determinative 
factor in deciding whether a meaningful reduction of a share- 
holder's interest has occurred within the purview of section 
302 (b) (1). 
3. Shareholder having a minority interest 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has issued three reve- 
nue rulings setting forth his position with respect to redemptions 
of the common stock of minority shareholders. These rulings out- 
line the results of a redemption where control is a significant part 
of a shareholder's interest and where it is not. 
a. "Control" a significant part of shareholder's interest. In 
Revenue Ruling 76-364," taxpayer A had actual ownership of 27 
percent of the outstanding common stock of corporation X. The 
remaining 73 percent was held equally by individuals B, C, and 
D. Thus, taxpayer A was in a position of substantial control, 
being able to control the corporation by forming a voting block 
with any one of the remaining three shareholders." After a por- 
tion of his common shares were redeemed for cash, taxpayer A 
owned 22.27 percent of the corporation's stock. The Commis- 
sioner ruled that the redemption was a meaningful reduction of 
the shareholder's interest. While he mentioned in his reasoning 
the reduction in the taxpayer's (1) right to vote, (2) right to earn- 
ings, and (3) right to share assets in liquidation," the Commis- 
sioner seemed to place greater reliance on the fact that the reduc- 
tion in taxpayer A's voting rights from 27 percent to 22.27 percent 
"caused A to go from a position of holding a block of X stock that 
afforded A control of X if A acted in concert with only one other 
stockholder, to a position where such action was not possible."" 
The ruling is consistent with Revenue Ruling 75-502 which 
held that a reduction in voting control from 57 percent to 50 
61. 1976-2 C.B. 91. 
62. For purposes of this article, a minority shareholder exercising substantial control 
is defined as a minority shareholder who has sufficient voting rights to have a practical 
influence over corporate affairs. The usual example of such a shareholder exists in a closely 
held corporation having few shareholders, none of whom owns a majority of the stock, but 
all of whom may have a practical influence over corporate affairs by aligning themeselves 
in a voting block with one or more fellow shareholders. See note 61 and accompanying 
text supra and notes 63-64, 97-104 and accompanying text infra. 
63. 1976-2 C.B. 91, at 92. 
64. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 57-353, 1957-2 C.B. 223. 
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percent is a meaningful redu~tion. '~ The rulings suggest that 
whether a shareholder owns a majority of voting stock or exercises 
control by virtue of a minority voting interest, he must experience 
a practical reduction in his voting control as a result of the re- 
demption in order to qualify for sale treatment. 
b. "Control" not a part of shareholder's interest. Revenue 
Ruling 75-5126~nvolved a trust that owned actually and con- 
structively 30 percent of the common stock of a corporation con- 
trolled and managed by an unrelated taxpayer.67 Following a re- 
demption of its common stock, the trust had no actual ownership 
but continued to own 24.3 percent of the corporation's stock 
through attribution. The Commissioner ruled that the redemp- 
tion qualified as a sale under section 302(b)(l) because the trust 
took no part in the management of the corporation, and its voting 
rights, right to earnings, and right to share in net assets on liqui- 
dation were all reduced. The Commissioner left unresolved, how- 
ever, the question of how large the reduction must be in order to 
qualify as meaningful. The facts presented in Revenue Ruling 75- 
512 involved a situation where the taxpayer's ownership was re- 
duced by 19 percent of what it had previously been, but it is not 
clear whether a lesser reduction would have qualified as meaning- 
ful. 
Revenue Ruling 76-385" suggests a partial answer to this 
question. In this ruling, the taxpayer had actual and constructive 
ownership of 0.0001118 percent of corporation 2's common stock 
prior to the redemption. Following the redemption, the taxpayer 
had no actual ownership and 0.0001081 percent constructive own- 
ership. Thus, the redemption only reduced the taxpayer's owner- 
ship by 3.3 percent of its previous figure. Nevertheless, the Com- 
missioner ruled that the reduction was meaningful and that the 
redemption was therefore not essentially equivalent to a divi- 
dend. In addition to citing the reduction in the taxpayer's three 
ownership interestsa9 as rationale for his ruling, the Commissioner 
stated: 
One purpose for the enactment of section 302(b)(l) of the Code 
was to provide capital gain treatment for redemptions of stock 
held by certain minority shareholders, especially minority hold- 
65. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra. 
66. 1975-2 C.B. 112. 
67. Id. 
68. 1976-2 C.B. 92. 
69. Id. at 93. 
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ers of preferred stock who exercise no control over corporate 
affairs . . . . 
The redemption in the instant case falls within the category 
of redemptions Congress intended to exclude from dividend 
treatment through the enactment of section 302(b)(l) of the 
Code since the redemption involves a minority shareholder 
whose relative stock interest in Z is minimal and who exercises 
no control over the affairs of Z.'O 
Revenue Ruling 76-385 concludes by referring to Revenue Ruling 
75-51271 as another instance in which the redemption of a minor- 
ity shareholder's interest was not essentially equivalent to a divi- 
dend. Although the two rulings were based on different ration- 
ales, the former on the legislative intenV2 and the latter on the 
meaningful reduction test,73 the factual similarity of the rulingsT4 
suggests that the rationale of either ruling may be broad enough 
to cover them both. In this light it seems probable that a redemp- 
tion of the common stock of a minority shareholder not exercising 
any controlling interestT5 will always qualify as a sale under sec- 
tion 302(b)(l) provided it results in some reduction in the stock- 
holder's percentage ownership." 
70. Id. (emphasis added). 
71. 1975-2 C.B. 112. 
72. See note 70 and accompanying text supra. 
73. 1975-2 C.B. at  113. 
74. Both rulings involved minority shareholders who exercised no control over the 
affairs of the corporation. The fact that one shareholder had only "minimal" ownership 
seems irrelevant when, as a practical matter, neither shareholder exercised any control. 
75. For a shareholder not to exercise any controlling interest in a corporation proba- 
bly requires that the shareholder have no reasonable possibility of exercising control by 
forming a voting block with other minority shareholders. See notes 67-70 and accompany- 
ing text supra. 
76. A redemption of the common stock of a minority shareholder exercising no control 
is analogous to a redemption of the preferred stock of such a shareholder since in neither 
case is control reduced; Thus, as in the preferred stock situation, any reduction in a 
shareholder's interest resulting from a redemption will qualify as a sale. See notes 105-16 
and accompanying text infra. 
The Commissioner apparently accepted this position prior to Davis. In Rev. Rul. 56- 
183, 1956-1 C.B. 161, four shareholders owned a total of 11% of the common stock of the 
corporation prior to redemption. The redemption resulted in a reduction in their owner- 
ship to 9%. The Commissioner ruled that this reduction was not essentially equivalent to 
a dividend. 
The Commissioner also reached this result in Rev. Rul. 56-485,1956-2 C.B. 176. There 
the Commissioner was asked to rule whether a transaction that involved a redemption of 
20% of the voting preferred stock of a corporation was essentially equivalent to a dividend. 
Although the preferred stock was owned to a large extent by the shareholders of common 
stock, it was not generally owned in the same proportion as the common stock. Thus, the 
- - 
redemption was generally non pro rata, resulting in a decrease in the proportionate inter- 
est of some shareholders and conceivably resulting in an increase in the interest of others. 
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B. Redemptions of Preferred Stock 
In 1964, the Second Circuit in Himmel v. Commi~sioner~~ 
established a "net effect" test of dividend equivalency applicable 
to preferred stock redemptions from shareholders owning both 
common and preferred stock. The test compared the amount ac- 
tually distributed to a redeeming shareholder with the amount 
that would have been distributed to the shareholder had a pro 
rata dividend with respect to common stock been declared. If the 
amount of the redeeming distribution equaled or approximated 
this hypothetical dividend, it was taxable as a dividend; if not, 
the redemption was taxable as a sale.78 
Although the broad language of Davis clearly was intended 
to embrace factual situations previously governed by Himmel, 
recent decisions have struggled with whether the Davis test re- 
placed the net effect test, or whether Himmel continues to pro- 
vide a useful tool for measuring a meaningful reduction. The 
following section will analyze these cases and examine how they 
have applied section 302(b)(l) in the context of shareholders 
holding more than one class of stock. 
1 .  Shareholder having complete common stock ownership 
The redemption of the nonvoting preferred stock of a sole 
common stock shareholder is analogous to a redemption of voting 
common stock from a sole shareholder. In neither instance has the 
shareholder lost any control. The facts of Davis fall within this 
ownership pattern, and the language in Davis to the effect that 
"a redemption [of a sole shareholder's stock] is .always 'essen- 
tially equivalent to a dividend' "7B is controlling. Therefore, such 
a redemption will never qualify for sale treatment under section 
3O2(b) (1). 
Although a sole common stock shareholder's redemption of 
The Commissioner ruled that the redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend 
as to each shareholder. The Commissioner noted as well that no single shareholder or 
family group had more than 25% of the voting power, apparently suggesting that control 
was not a major interest of any shareholder. Id. 
Although the meaning of "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" has been modified 
significantly in the 21 years since this ruling, the Commissioner has neither modified nor 
reversed his position. Based on the meaningful reduction requirement, however, the Com- 
missioner is unlikely ever to treat as a sale a redemption that results in an increase in 
percentage ownership. 
77. 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964). 
78. Id. at 817-20. 
79. 397 U.S. at 307. 
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preferred stock where unrelated shareholders own the remaining 
preferred shares results in a reduction of his right to dividends 
and right to share in liquidation proceeds, recent decisions have 
not considered this reduction of "net worth" to be meaningful 
when the sole common stock shareholder does not experience any 
loss of control." This appears to be the rule whether the redemp- 
tion is of all8' or of only a portion of the preferred stock." 
2. Shareholder having majority common stock ownership 
Because preferred stock typically does not give the share- 
holder voting rights, a redemption of preferred stock can only 
result in a reduction of two of the three shareholder interests 
discussed above.83 Thus, it is unclear whether a redemption of 
preferred stock from a controlling shareholder can ever result in 
a meaningful reduction. Majority shareholders have made two 
principal arguments in an effort to receive sale treatment for 
redemptions of their preferred stock. 
First, several taxpayers have argued that Himmela estab- 
lished that a non pro rata redemption could not be essentially 
equivalent to a dividend and that the Supreme Court accepted 
this position in Davis.85 One federal district court, in Brown v.  
United States," read Himmel as requiring such a result where a 
haphazard pattern of distributions in exchange for preferred 
stock was involved. The court concluded, however, that because 
the taxpayer's ownership percentage of preferred actually in- 
creased as a result of the redemption, the taxpayer's interest was 
- - - - - - -- - 
80. See Benjamin v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1084, 1111 (1976): "Whatever changes 
in net worth and participation in earnings [taxpayer] experienced as a result of the 
distribution, factors considered by the Second Circuit in Himmel v. Commissioner, supra, 
in our opinion the retention of absolute voting control in the present case outweighs any 
other consideration." 
81. Although no recent cases involving sole shareholders have so held, this rule has 
governed complete redemptions of the preferred stock of majority shareholders and thus 
applies to sole shareholders a fortiori. See note 95 and accompanying text infra. See also 
Rev. Rul. 56-521, 1956-2 C.B. 174. 
82. See Benjamin v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 3459, 3481 (1976). 
83. These two ownership interests are (1) the right to dividends and (2) the right to 
share in assets on liquidation. See note 29 and accompanying text supra. 
84. 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964). 
85. See Brown v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 241, 246 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 477 
F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973); Grabowski Trust v. Commissioner, 
58 T.C. 650 (1972); Furr v. Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 433 (1975); Furr v. 
Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 426 (1975). 
86. 345 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
414 US.  1011 (1973). 
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not meaningfully reduced." The Tax Court, however, has not 
interpreted Himmel as requiring sale treatment for every non pro 
rata distribution, but as requiring satisfaction of a two pronged 
test. In addition to being disproportionate with respect to com- 
mon stock, the distribution must also result in a change in the 
shareholder's "relative economic interest or rights of owner- 
ship."88 The Tax Court has also indicated that any other interpre- 
tation of Himmel would be in conflict with DaviP since Davis 
requires a reduction in a shareholder's interest.'O 
Second, taxpayers have argued that because Himmel lists 
several ownership rights, a redemption that results in a reduction 
of some but not of all these interests is still a meaningful reduc- 
tion? The courts, however, have not been persuaded by the argu- 
ment. The Tax Court has implied that in the case of a majority 
shareholder, the redemption must also result in a change in con- 
trol. This follows from application of the Davis meaningful reduc- 
tion test.92 This requirement eliminates the possibility of ever 
receiving sale treatment when a controlling shareholder's nonvot- 
ing preferred stock is redeemed," regardless of whether the re- 
demption of preferred stock is partialM or complete.Q5 More impor- 
tantly, the inability of a controlling shareholder to achieve a 
meaningful reduction does not seem to depend on whether the 
redemption satisifies the first prong of the Himmel test, i.e., 
87. The district court apparently misread the net effect test of Himmel. The court 
interpreted Himmel as sanctioning sale treatment of any disproportionate distribution 
whether it increases or decreases a shareholder's proportionate interest. See 345 F. Supp. 
a t  246-47. The Second Circuit, however, has indicated in interpreting its own test that a 
distribution that was disproportionate but increased the shareholder's interest could not 
satisfy the Himmel test. Rather, the disproportionate distribution must decrease the 
shareholder's interest. See Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1967). 
Therefore, the distribution in Brown did not satisfy the Himmel test. See also Grabowski 
Trust v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 650, 656 (1972). 
88. See Furr v. Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 426, 431 (1975). 
89. Id. 
90. The second prong of the Himmel test apparently sets out the same standard as 
the meaningful reduction test of Davis. 
91. See Furr v. Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 426, 430-33 (1975); Furr v. 
Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 433, 436 (1975). 
92. Furr v. Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. a t  431. 
93. Obviously, a shareholder redeeming nonvoting preferred stock will never experi- 
ence a reduction in voting control. 
94. See Brown v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 
599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 US.  1011 (1973); Grabowski Trust v. Commissioner, 58 
T.C. 650 (1972); Furr v. Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 433 (1975); Furr v. Commis- 
sioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 426 (1975); Hayes v. Commissioner, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 
378 (1971). 
95. See Gray v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1032, 1071-73 (1971). 
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whether it is non pro rata with respect to common stock share- 
h o l d e r ~ . ~ ~  
3. Shareholder having minority common stock ownership 
a. "Control" a significant part of shareholder's interest. 
Miele v. Commissionerg7 is the only recent case that has raised the 
question of the whether a redemption of the preferred stock of a 
minority shareholder exercising some control can ever result in a 
meaningful reduction. In Miele five taxpayers, each with sub- 
stantial control," owned almost all of the outstanding stock of a 
small corporation. These taxpayers owned preferred stock in the 
same proportion as their common stock. Thus, when their pre- 
ferred shares were completely redeemed, the resulting distribu- 
tion was pro rata with respect to their common stockholdings. 
The Tax Court held that the redemption was essentially equiva- 
lent to a dividend since it did not change the relative interests or 
- - - - - -  
96. See Brown v. United States, 345 I?. Supp. 241 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (pro rata), aff'd, 
477 F.2d 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U S .  1011 (1973); Grabowski Trust v. Commis- 
sioner, 58 T.C. 650 (1972) (non pro rata); Gray v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1032 (1971) (pro 
rata); Miele v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 556, 567 (1971) (pro rata), aff'd men . ,  474 F.2d 
1338 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U S .  982 (1973); Furr 
v. Commissioner, 34 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 433 (1975) (non pro rata); Hayes v. Commis- 
sioner, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 378 (1971) (non pro rata). See also Rev. Rul. 66-37, 1966-1 
C.B. 209. 
The only instance in which the first prong of the Himmel test could arguably apply 
is in the case of a redemption of stock from a minority shareholder exercising no control. 
In such a redemption, the meaningful reduction test does not require a reduction in voting 
rights. The Commissioner continues to require such a redemption to be non pro rata in 
order to receive sale treatment. The legislative history of 6 302(b)(l), however, arguably 
does not require anon pro rata redemption. See notes 111-16 and accompanying text infra. 
In the case of common stock redemptions, the first prong of Himmel is encompassed 
in the Davis meaningful reduction test. A common stock redemption must be non pro rata 
to result in a reduction in voting control, and since a reduction in voting control is required 
to meet the meaningful reduction test, a common stock redemption that qualifies for sale 
treatment will be non pro rata. 
97. 56 T.C. 556 (1971), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Albers v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 982 (1973) (Powell, Douglas, & Blackmun, JJ., dissent- 
ing). 
Other cases arising from the same transaction as Miele were La Fera Contracting Co. 
v. Commissioner, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 691 (1971), aff'd rnem., 475 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 
1973) and Spiniello v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1973) (mem.). 
98. For a definition of a minority shareholder having substantial control, see note 62 
supra. 
Each shareholder in Miele owned actually and constructively approximately one- 
third of the corporation's common stock. Thus, each shareholder could form a majority 
voting block by aligning himself with another shareholder. Cf. notes 61-64 and accompa- 
nying text supra (minority shareholder exercising substantial control redeems common 
stock). 
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rights of the stockholders.9g The Third Circuit upheld this deter- 
mination on appeal. loo 
Although the redemption in Miele was pro rata as to the 
shareholder's common stockholdings, it is probable that the same 
result would have obtained even had the distribution been non 
pro rata. This conclusion is supported by Revenue Ruling 76- 
364,1°1 which held that a minority shareholder with substantial 
control over corporate affairs must experience a reduction in 
practical control as a result of the redemption in order to qualify 
for sale treatment.loP Thus, a redemption of preferred stock of a 
minority shareholder exercising control may never satisfy the test 
of section 302(b)(l)lo3 since he will experience no reduction in 
practical control as a result of the redemption.lo4 
b. "Control" not a part of shareholder's interest. A redemp- 
99. 56 T.C. at 567. 
100. 474 F.2d at 1338. 
101. 1976-2 C.B. 91. 
102. See notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra. 
103. The minority shareholder exercising control is treated similarly to a majority 
shareholder. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text supra. Some have suggested that this 
strict rule which applies to both majority shareholders and minority shareholders exercis- 
ing control is required to prevent tax abuse. Were it not for the rule, a shareholder could 
have a portion of his preferred stock redeemed at capital gain rates and subsequently 
declare a stock dividend to restore his preferred stock. This tax avoidance scheme is what 
prompted legislation of the predecessor to § 302. See notes 6-10 and accompanying text 
supra. 
It seems more likely, however, that the result of this strict rule will be inequitable. 
This is the position taken by three Supreme Court Justices dissenting from a denial of 
certiorari in Miele (sub nom. Albers v. Commissioner, 414 US. 982 (1973) (Powell, Doug- 
las & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting)). In Miele, the shareholders had issued preferred stock 
in order to increase the corporation's private capital so that the Federal Maritime Com- 
mission would guarantee a first mortgage loan from a bank to the corporation. When the 
need for the additional capital no longer existed, the corporation redeemed the preferred 
stock. This resulted in a taxable dividend to the shareholders in the amount of the distri- 
bution. This harsh result appears somewhat inequitable in view of the fact that if the 
financing had been arranged with a shareholder loan rather than preferred stock, a 
nontaxable return of capital would have resulted. Moreover, the taxpayers received a 
distribution of precisely the same amount that they had previously contributed. The 
dissenting Justices argued that this inequity was too high a price to pay for ease of 
administration. 414 U.S. at 985. The Justices also suggested that the Davis test creates a 
"tax trap" for the unwary and should be reconsidered. Id. at 988. 
104. Although the Commissioner's current position in Rev. Rul. 76-364 suggests that 
a reduction in control is needed to satisfy 302(b)(l), a different result was suggested by 
Rev. Rul. 55-462, 1955-2 C.B. 221. In-that ruling, individuals A and B each owned 50% of 
the common stock of corporation M_A also owned 15 shares of preferred stock; B owned 
1 share. Pursuant to a shareholder agreement to equalize their holdings, A redeemed 14 
preferred shares for cash. The Commissioner ruled that the distribution was not essen- 
tially equivalent to a dividend. Although the Commissioner has neither withdrawn nor 
modified this ruling, it is unlikely that he will follow it in light of Rev. Rul. 76-364. 
2531 "MEANINGFUL REDUCTION" TEST 271 
tion of the preferred stock of a minority common stock share- 
holder who has no control over corporate affairs seems to be 
clearly within the congressional intent of section 302(b)(l).lo5 
Moreover, because control does not form a part of the share- 
holder's interest in the corporation, both the Davis and Himmel 
tests are satisfied if a disproportionate redemption results in a 
reduction of the shareholder's rights to earnings and to assets on 
liquidation. lo6 
In Agway, Inc. u. United States,lo7 the taxpayer held less 
than 6 percent of the voting stock of a farmers' cooperative. Prior 
to the redemption, the taxpayer also held 18.0 percent of the 
cooperative's outstanding preferred stock that he had received in 
lieu of cash patronage refunds pursuant to the cooperative's by- 
laws.'08 The redemption of preferred stock, also pursuant to the 
cooperative's bylaws,loB resulted in an 11 percent reduction in 
taxpayer's ownership of preferred stock to 16.1 percent. The court 
held that the redemption should be treated as a sale rather than 
as a dividend.liO The result reached by the court seems correct in 
view of the reduction in the taxpayer's right to earnings and right 
to assets on liquidation. 
Several recent revenue rulings have also suggested that the 
redemption of preferred stock in the case of a noncontrolling 
shareholder will result in sale treatment in certain circumstances. 
In Revenue Ruling 74-515,ll1 corporation X merged into corpora- 
tion Y in a section 368 reorganization. Pursuant to the merger, the 
preferred stock of X was exchanged for cash. Several shareholders 
of X corporation held both common and preferred stock of X prior 
105. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. 
106. In the case of a minority common stock shareholder exercising no control over 
the corporation, a redemption of preferred stock may receive sale treatment even if it is 
pro rata with respect to common stock. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text infra. 
107. 524 F.2d 1194 (Ct. C1. 1975). 
108. Id. at  1196-97. 
109. Id. 
110. In reaching its decision, the Court of Claims rejected the Davis test stating: 
"This case is easily distinguishable from 9 302(b)(l) cases involving corporations with 
related shareholders where 'attribution' and 6 318 applies. See United States v.  Davis 
. . . ." Id. at 1198. Since the corporation's bylaws required preferred stock to be redeemed 
in the same order it had been issued, any redemption by the corporation would be non 
pro rata. The court therefore concluded that the Himmel test was met and the redemption 
should be treated as a sale. Id. The reasoning of the court is somewhat dubious since the 
broad language of Davis was clearly intended to embrace all stock redemptions. The Davis 
meaningful reduction test was satisfied in this case, however, since any reduction in 
shareholder interest caused by the redemption of stock of a shareholder with no practical 
voting control is meaningful. See notes 66-76 and accompanying text supra. 
111. 1974-2 C.B. 118. 
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to the exchange. The Commissioner applied section 302(b)(l) to 
determine whether the exchange resulted in a dividend to these 
shareholders.l12 The Commissioner concluded that the distribu- 
tion was not a dividend because none of the shareholders had any 
form of control over X (all owned less than 1 percent)l13 and the 
cash distribution was disproportionate with respect to the com- 
mon stockholdings of the X shareholders.l14 
On the other hand, the Commissioner has suggested that he 
will treat a pro rata redemption of preferred stock as a dividend.l15 
The legislative history of section 3O2(b) (1), however, does not 
support this position. Congress apparently intended minority 
common stock shareholders who also own preferred stock to re- 
ceive the benefit of sale treatment when their preferred stock is 
redeemed. Their lack of control seemed to be the touchstone of 
the Senate amendment to the House version of section 302.ll6 It 
therefore seems irrelevant whether or not the redemption of pre- 
ferred stock coincidentally is pro rata with respect to common 
stock ownership. 
4. Shareholder having no common stock ownership 
The Commissioner has suggested in Revenue Ruling 74-515"' 
that a complete redemption from a shareholder holding only pre- 
ferred stock will result in sale treatment. In this ruling, share- 
holders of preferred stock in corporation X had their interests 
entirely terminated118 when they received cash for their shares 
112. For an explanation of why the test of 4 302(b)(l) was used, see note 53 supra. 
113. 1974-2 C.B. at 19-20. 
114. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 56-179, 1956-1 C.B. 187. 
115. In Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118, 119-20, the Commissioner indicated that 
Rev. Rul. 56-220, 1956-1 C.B. 191 (classifying pro rata cash distributions as dividends) 
would have controlled had the cash distribution been pro rata with respect to the common 
stockholdings of the taxpayers. 
116. S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45, reprinted in [I9541 U.S.  CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4675 (emphasis added): 
[The House] rules appeared unnecessarily restrictive, particularly, in the case 
of redemptions of preferred stock which might be called by the corporation 
without the shareholder having any control over when the redemption may take 
place. Accordingly, your committee follows existing law by reinserting the gen- 
eral language indicating that a redemption shall be treated as a distribution in 
part or full payment in exchange for stock if the redemption is not essentially 
equivalent to a dividend. 
117. 1974-2 C.B. 118. 
118. Although it is unclear why 4 302(b)(3) dealing with complete termination of a 
shareholder's interest did not apply in this instance, a t  least two explanations are possible: 
First, the shareholders may have continued to have had a forbidden interest in the corpo- 
ration, or second, the shareholders may have failed to file the required waiver. See I.R.C. 
§ 302(b)(3). 
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pursuant to a merger between corporation X and corporation Y. 
The Commissioner ruled that the preferred stock shareholders 
receipt of cash would receive sale treatment under section 302 
because it was not essentially equivalent to a dividend.llg In 
Cummins Diesel Sales Corp. v. United States, 120 a federal district 
court held that sale treatment will result even if the redemption 
does not completely terminate the shareholder's interest.121 Both 
the legislative history of section 3O2(b) (1)122 and the meaningful 
reduction test123 seem to require the results reached in the case 
and in the ruling. 
The Commissioner might object to sale treatment, however, 
in certain circumstances. For example, if the preferred share- 
holder exercised control over the corporation as a practical matter 
by virtue of his holding a major financial interest in the corpora- 
tion, a redemption occurring because of this control might not 
qualify for sale treatment.124 
Recent cases and rulings discussing dividend equivalency 
under section 302(b)(l) have suggested two basic rules. If a share- 
holder exercises any control over the redeeming corporation 
(whether as a majority or minority shareholder), a redemption of 
his stock will receive sale treatment only if the shareholder expe- 
riences a significant reduction of whatever degree of control he 
previously maintained. The actual percentage reduction in voting 
shares is relevant only to the extent it produces a practical loss 
of control. This rule makes it virtually impossible for a share- 
119. 1974-2 C.B. at 119-20. See also Rev. Rul. 56-179, 1956-1 C.B. 187. 
120. 323 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, 459 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1972). 
121. Cummins Diesel Sales Corporation established ten local branches as sales out- 
lets. These branches were owned by independent parties with Cummins providing major 
financing through ownership of preferred stock. In one such case, the independent owner 
did not operate successfully so Cummins reacquired the independent branch in a transac- 
tion in which Cummins had its preferred stock redeemed and also received common stock. 
Because Cummins received common stock subsequent to the redemption, O 302(b)(3) did 
not apply. The court held, however, that the redemption satisifed the provisions of O 
302(b)(l). Id. a t  1118. 
122. See notes 18, 116 and accompanying text supra. 
123. Cf. notes 71-76 and accompanying text supra (meaningful reduction in the com- 
mon stock redemption context). 
124. Since a reduction in control is required to satisfy the meaningful reduction test 
if the redeeming shareholder exercises control, the type of control, whether voting or 
financial, seems irrelevant. Cf. Cummins Diesel Sales Corp. v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 
a t  1118 (court held a redemption of preferred stock to be a sale under 8 302(b)(l), yet 
suggested that the shareholder exercised considerable control). 
274 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1977: 
holder exercising control to avoid dividend treatment when his 
preferred stock is redeemed. 
If, however, a shareholder exercises no practical control over 
the corporation, it appears that any redemption resulting in a 
reduction of the shareholder's interest should be treated as a sale. 
Although this rule has never been expressly stated, both legisla- 
tive history and recent decisions and rulings support its validity. 
